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Who pays on a date?

2020.08.14 22:25 ichhassesommer Who pays on a date?

So I stumbled upon this video on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CdJcwFe_TM
While I agree that the one who invites should pay on a date, I do not think it is taboo for a woman to spend her money for the partner.
I believe that a relationship is a group work and everyone takes care of it by bringing in their resources, let it be money, time, skills, etc. Since first time dating back in high school, I always try to pay 50-50 on a date. If my then boyfriend had more money and paid for the meal, I tried to chip in by paying the toll ticket, for example. On the first years of marriage (and unemployment), my husband told me that my labor at home was not unpaid. He can work with ease mind because I take care of the house works, thus I also contribute to his work performance (and salary). Some may argue that men should pay more since they also earn more. Well, it depends on the profession. A woman who works as an engineer could bring home more money than a male nurse, for example. One should be stable financially (not necessarily rich) before entering a serious relationship, either one is a female or a male.
What do you think, Puan?
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2019.06.06 08:59 annadpk Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 1

I really haven't been following this election unlike the 2014 and 2017 Jakarta Governor's election, but I will like to present my analysis why Prabowo legitimately thought he could win, the new challenges that faced Prabowo in 2019 and why ultimately lost. The analysis will be divided into eleven sections
  1. Why Prabowo Thought He Could Win
  2. New Challenges Faced by Prabowo in 2019
  3. Prabowo's Assets In 2019 Campaign: Epitome of Tactics over Strategy
  4. Prabowo's Strategy and How Did Prabowo Do?
  5. Caught by the Javanese Tsunami
  6. Protecting the Javanese Homeland
  7. Two Pillars of Javanese Society
  8. Playing with Stereotypes
  9. Culture Clash: Indonesian Campaign vs Javanese Campaign
  10. Rising Javanese Identity
  11. Jokowi: Javanese Muse and Storyteller
This is going to be very long, because it covers material not many people are familiar with. Jokowi is Javanese and Jokowi won because of the surge of support in the Javanese home provinces (Tanah Jawa) of Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta. Many Indonesians understand him the way a foreigner would, because they look at him as Indonesians, not as Javanese. We need to look at election in the Javanese home provinces from a Javanese perspective to really understand what went on.
Warning: This post is 11,000 words long or 20 single space pages.. I decided to do this post, because its been a long time since I written any post like this for /Indonesia. I wanted to finish this before the official election results were announced, but it took longer than expected, because I kept revising the last 5-6 sections. Since the post is over the reddit maximum post length, I broke it down into two parts.
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 1 (Sections 1-7)
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 2 (Section 8-11)

WHY PRABOWO THOUGHT HE COULD WIN

Unlike many people and the polls, I thought Prabowo had a good chance of winning. Here are some of the reasons.
The gubernatorial elections of 2017-2018, particularly Sudirman Said's results in Central Java, While Sudirman Said lost by 17%, he managed to get 42% of the vote in a PDI-P strong hold against a longstanding and popular PDP-P party member, Ganjar Pranowo. Most polls expected him to get only 20% of the vote. This race was more important than the Jakarta election for Gerindra and Prabowo, because it showed them that it was possible to do well in Central Java. Said run on a modest budget, imagine a well funded effort would do in a Presidential election. The wins in Jakarta and North Sumatra, and close finish for the so-so PKS candidate in West Java gave room for optimism.
Jusuf Kalla wasn't going to be Jokowi's running mate in 2019. In 2009, Jusuf kalla won 12% or 15 Million votes. Losing Kalla most likely cost Jokowi a couple of millions votes. Jusuf Kalla is popular in Eastern Indonesia and Aceh, and not just in Sulawesi or among the Bugis, but among many non-Bugis as well. Its why Jokowi spent a lot money on infrastructure in Sulawesi to compensate for losing Kalla in 2019.
Jokowi's so-so economic performance. During the 2014 election, Jokowi had promises 7% growth, and he only managed to deliver 5%. Also some of Jokowi's economic policies weren't well thought out. Many of the infrastructure projects, like trans Papua, had a very low rate of return, which is understandable since you are building roads in the middle of nowhere.
Declining enthusiasm among Jokowi's base as a result of failure to protect Ahok and putting on Ma'ruf Amin on the ticket. If you were to measure Siandiaga Uno and Ma'ruf Amin popularity individually, Uno does a lot better. All these factors could influence voter turnout.
Ma'ruf Amin was a compromise candidate meant to appease Jokowi's backers, both the political parties and NU. Ma'ruf selection was a political calculation to maintain NU support and unity, not electoral one. If Jokowi could get NU support and pick a better VP candidate, he would have ended doing better. Mahfud MD polled better among Muslim voters than Ma'ruf. While the press thought appointment Ma'ruf would dissuade progressive and non-Muslim from voting for Jokowi, Ma'ruf. as a high ranking NU leader actually hurt Jokowi's support among non-NU Muslims more, particularly in Sumatra.

NEW CHALLENGES FACED BY PRABOWO IN 2019

Most military officers today, including Prabowo, haven;t fought peer competitors. While going against OPM or Fretlin is dangerous, its not like trying to invade Malaysia. Prabowo-Sandi campaigning in Central and East Java, from a military standpoint is like the Indonesian army invading and penetrating deep into Malaysia.
Jokowi had the benefit of Incumbency, this is particularly important for Jokowi, who's ties to PDI-P political machinery isn't strong. For those who didn't follow the 2014 election, Jokowi's 2014 campaign was poorly organized and scheduled. Jokowi didn't have access to party infrastructure and transportation as described in this New Mandala article. The PDI-P only really supported Jokowi during the last three weeks of the campaign, when Prabowo had cut Jokowi's lead to 2-3%.
The PDI-P, PKB and other coalition parties were out in force in support of Jokowi, because first the legislative and Presidential elections were held on the same day. Secondly, this was Jokowi's last term, winning this term, means that people like Puan Maharani have a chance to compete in 2024. A Prabowo-Sandi victory could mean a possible 10-15 year wait. The PDI-P and its coalition partners were much more engaged than they were in 2014.
Jokowi and coalition partners control the governorship of all the main provinces on Java - West, Central and East Java. Even in West Java, Jokowi benefited from Ridwan Kamal being the governor. His control of the governorship prevented Jokowi from losing support as he did in other provinces that Prabowo had won in 2014 like West Sumatra and NTB.

PRABOWO'S ASSETS IN THE 2019 CAMPAIGN: EPITOME OF TACTICS OVER STRATEGY

Since Prabowo started running for the President in 2004, his endeavors have often been dominated by decisions made at the last moment and short term opportunism. Only in the Presidential Election of 2014 show a build up to the election. There are three patterns one can see from Prabowo's political career over the last decade.
Going into 2019, Prabowo was left with Gerindra, an organization with no credible senior management and limited grass roots organization. The lack of a grassroots organization, is the reason why Gerindra aligns itself with the likes of PKS and FPI. However, even the PKS and other parties at the local level in Prabowo's coalition correctly sensed something was different about this election in Central and East Java, withheld support, and focused on their own campaigns. That is why I suspect Prabowo-Sandi justification in building the Postko in Central and East Java, getting the FPI and other conservative groups involved.
Role of Sandi
Despite what people believe, I don't think he was an asset. Sandi was a compromise candidate, and his biggest advantage was he brought money. But other than that he didn't really bring additional voters, no grass roots organization and no government experience. To be honest, after this campaign Sandi is toast politically. He is a political light weight, always trying to minimize damage, but at the end he comes off looking weak. When he was called sandiwara, his mother jump to his defense. As we have the riots, there are people who are willing to kill to obtain power in Indonesia, the last thing the country need is a Mommy's boy.
As for his economic acumen, you can hire a finance minister. Every cabinet in Indonesia rotates through the same dozen economists, The reality is Sandi's economic message didn't catch on with voters in Central and East Java. because the economies of Java and the outer island are fundamentally different. Added add on culture and class, to most Javanese voters, Sandi was speaking Martian.

PRABOWO STRATEGY AND HOW DID PRABOWO DO?

Prabowo had lost the 2014 Election by 8.5 Million votes or 6.3%, or if he could swing 3.15% of the vote his way he would win. He had three factors working to his advantage in 2019. The first was Kalla wasn't in the race. The second, was the negative impact of low resource prices, this impacted the economies of resource rich provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan, impacting non-Muslims and Muslims alike. In Kalimantan, district with large Chinese and Christian majority population showed a drop in support for Jokowi compared to 2014. The third factor were new voters, who are more educated and conservative who would be voting for the first time. The factor working against Prabowo was the loss of the non-Muslim vote in non-resource provinces, particularly the minority majority provinces like NTT, Bali, North Sulawesi and Maluku.
Whatever he had gained in the outer islands, it wouldn't be enough to make up the difference. So the provinces on Java - West, East and Central Java would be critical. All Prabowo had to do was maintain his support in Javanese homeland (East, Central and Yogyakarta) and gain 1% from Jokowi in West Java, Bantan and his margins outside Java will allow him to eke out a small victory. Not altogether a unrealistic strategy, given Sudirman Said's performance in the governor's election in 2018.
For the purposes talking about the election results I am going to divide Indonesian provinces into six groups - Stable, Kalla, Resource, Javanese Homeland, non-Muslim Majority , and Outliers. The elections results can be categorized in five groups. The first are provinces that are stable. meaning their result changed by less than 5% points relative to 2014. These provinces economies also didn't show a sharp drop in per capita GDP growth like the provinces in the Resource group compare to the SBY era. The second group, are effects that benefit Prabowo, the Kalla and the resource effect The third group is the non-Muslim majority provinces. The fourth group are the Javanese homeland provinces (which also include Lampung given the majority Javanese population and very long settlement history). The last group are outliers, which include Bangka-Belitung, West Sumatra and Gorontalo. Bangka-Belitung even though its predominantly non-Javanese Muslim region, it has a long history of supporting PDI-P candidates. Megawati did better here in 2009 than she did in Central Java. Its resource economy was severely impacted by lower commodity prices, Prabowo only got 36.3% vs 32.73% in 2014. West Sumatra despite a generally healthy economy, with per capita GDP growing above 4%, Jokowi's support dropped by 10.14% points to only 12.89%. This had to do with putting Maruf Amin, an NU leader on the ticket. The last outlier, was Gorontalo, which Prabowo's support dropped from 63% to 48% even though growth in per capita GDP went from 5.89% per year to 4.87%. I still haven't figure out why Prabowo lost Gorontalo.
The first column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Provinces the same as in 2014. The second column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Province adjusted so Prabowo=Sandi's results in Central Java mirror those of Said's 2018 results. The third column contains the actual results

Provinces % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like 2014 % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like Said 2018 Actual; 2019 Results
STABLE: North Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, NTB, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua, North Kalimantan, Overseas 29,038,542 (2014: 54,29% 2019: 54.52% +124,998 votes) 29,038,542 29,038,542
KALLA: Aceh, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi 5,868,052 (2014: 38% 2019 66.10% +2,494,919 votes) 5,868,052 5,868,052
RESOURCE: Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Riau Island, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Sulawesi 10,756,042 (2014: 45.73% 2019: 54.16% +1,673,573 votes) 10,756,042 10,756,042
jAVANESE: Lampung, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta 21,878,185 23,580,062 15,568,118 (2014: 41.23% 2019: 29.81% -5,968,233 votes)
NON-MUSLIM MAJORITY: Bali, NTT, North Sulawesi and Maluku 1,236,272 (2014: 36.42% 2019: 16.21% -1,540,985 votes) 1,236,272 1,236,272
OUTLIERS Bangka Belitung, West Sumatra, Gorontalo 3,080,198 (2014: 66.97% 2019: 70.94% +181,330 votes) 3,080,198 3,080,198
TOTAL 71,857,291 (49.17%) 73,559,168 (50.30) 65.651.967 (44.85%)
If you factor our the change in results in the Javanese Homeland the election results were a lot closer than many realize. There are four things one can take away from the election.
Had Prabowo's vote share in the Javanese home provinces remained the same as in 2014, he would gotten a very close result and would have bogged down the Constitutional Court and possibly lead to much more serious political unrest. Had he managed repeat what Said did in Central Java in 2018, he would have won with a thin margin.
Note: Here is the spreadsheet with breakdown province by province. The data for 2014, and 2019. For growth in per capita GDP was taken here. The census data on ethnicity was from this book by BPS.

CAUGHT BY THE JAVANESE TSUNAMI

Here is a table of showing the 4 provinces where the Javanese make a majority of the population, 74% of the Javanese population lives in these 4 provinces. I use the term Javanese Tsunami to draw parallels to the Malay Tsunami in Malaysian politics.
Province Javanese as % Total Jokowi 2014 Jokowi 2019 Change
East Java 80.0% 53% 66% 13%
Central Java 97.5% 67% 77% 10%
DI Yogyakarta 95.5% 56% 69% 13%
Lampung 63.5% 53% 60% 7%
For East Java I estimate about 59% of the Javanese population voted for Jokowi in 2014, and in 2019 about 73%. Madurese make up 17.5% of East Java's population. On Madura Island where 60% of Madurese in East Java live, Prabowo got 73% of the vote. In East Java, many districts in the North have a mixed Javanese/Madurese population, looking at the preliminary data, outside the 4 districts on Madura and 1-2 districts that have a majority Madurese population, the only district that showed no shift toward Jokowi is SBY home district of Pacitan.
In Central Java, it not only caught Prabowo-Sandi by surprise, but the provincial PDI-P organization as well. Ganjar Pranowo, the Governor of Central Java, was targeting 70% of the vote in Central Java. This was reflected down to the kabupaten level, in Sragen, PDI-P officials were targeting 74%, but got 80% according to the quick count. This was a safe assumption given that Ganjar only got 58% against Said, and Jokowi was facing a much better funded campaign in 2019 than Ganjar did in 2018. I think the PDI-P assumed Jokowi path to victory would involve getting more votes among non-Javanese Muslims than he did.
There is assumption is that religious minorities and Javanese voted for similar reasons, I don't think this is valid given that most Javanese voted along similar lines as other Muslims in the Jakarta election.
NU Madurese members still voted for Prabowo like they did in 2014, while Javanese voters in Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta showed a large swing to Jokowi, particularly in areas where Jokowi lost or won by narrow margins. In Galur and Kota Gede Kecamatan in Yogyakarta, two Muhammadiyah areas, Prabowo got 55% in 2014, in 2019 he only managed 41 and 45% respectively. Muhammadiyah didn't endorse the two sides, but most Javanese members voted for Jokowi, most likely because they couldn't stand Rizieq Shibab with his self-appointed title "Imam Besar". In the three districts in Yogyakarta, Kulon Prago, Bantul and Sleman, Prabowo got 48%, 46% and 46% of the vote in 2014, in 2019 it dropped to 32%,32% and 33%. In contrast, Kota Yogyakarta which Prabowo got 40% of the vote, it only dropped to 34%. You see something similar in predominately Javanese districts in East Java, Prabowo won Gresik, East Java with 53% in 2014, he lost with 33% in 2019.
Jokowi's got about 74% of the Javanese vote in Javanese home provinces, and most likely above 70% of the Javanese vote in Javanese dominant districts in West Java like Indramayu and Subang. SBY in 2009 got about 57% of the Javanese vote in 2009. Even under the New Order, Golkar never got more than 70% of the vote in Central / East Java.
Given that there was large shifts in how Javanese voted from 2014 and 2019, one should ask "Why Did Javanese shift heavily to Jokowi in 2019?"

PROTECTING THE JAVANESE HOMELAND

The first reason why the Javanese shifted heavily to Jokowi in 2019 was important pillars of Javanese society felt threatened by a common threat (PKS, Gerindra and FPI). The mood in the Javanese homeland was of righteous indignation (atau kemarahan benar in Indonesian), which Jokowi and others on his side were able to channel.
THREATS FROM WEST JAVA
The Javanese think of power as a concentric circle, with Central-East Java at the center, and everything radiating outward. Serious threats have always come from either the North (Mongols and Japan) or from the West (Dutch). This continued after independence, from 1949-1960, the Darul Islam movement was centered in West Java, In 1998, riots moved from Medan to Jakarta than to West Java than to Central Java before petering out in Surabaya. During May Riots, Wiranto called troops from KODAM Diponegoro from Central Java to secure Jakarta, and that is why the riots lasted 48 hours. He couldn't trust Kostrad or KODAM Siliwangi, Today, you see the same "threats" from West Java in the form of Gerindra-PKS-FPI alliance in the 2019 Presidential Election. To the Javanese living in the Javanese home provinces, Jakarta isn't the center. but an outlying, unstable and problematic "territory".
The reason for this is since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda in 1500s, there has been a power and cultural vacuum in West Java. The subsequent Muslim kingdoms in West Java, whether the Cirebon or Banten Sultanates, never filled the void left by the Kingdom of Sunda for the Sundanese. The Sundanese are a people in crisis. They belonged to the Dharmic world like the Javanese-Balinese, but since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda, they have been wondering adrift,
How would your average Javanese feel when Prabowo or Sandi enters their town being escorted by FPI members? To many its like an invading army coming from the West, lead by a traitor, Prabowo. This is ironic, given that elite betrayal of the ordinary people is a common theme in Prabowo's political campaigns. Here is a video of scuffle between residents and FPI, who were guarding Prabowo in Gresik, East Java. Prabowo won Gresik in 2014, but lost heavily in 2019. You see this across East and Central Java, in predominately Javanese districts which Jokowi had lost or won with small margins in 2014, you see big shifts sometimes as much as 15-25 percentage points favoring him. The biggest difference between Sudirman Said's 2018 Campaign and Prabowo-Sandi Campaign was FPI did not have significant involvement in the Said's campaign.
Most Javanese are OK with FPI, as long as they stay away from Central Java and East Java, and don't take control of Islam nationally. The animosity toward FPI is attributed in part, because most of its top leadership are Arab Indonesians. No senior national figure talked openly about their ethnicity, until Hendropriyono open his big mouth. The thought of Rizieq Shibab, an Arab-Betawi half-breed, even getting near the Ministry of Religion, would cause many Javanese to throw up.
Why did Prabowo-Sandi allow FPI to get involved in the East-Central Java campaign?. My theory is it could be used to maintain support of FPI and other conservative groups in other regions. Prabowo and Gerindra don't have a strong grassroots, and with his supporting parties not willing to fully commit manpower to support him in East and Central Java, he was dependent on groups like the FPI.
JAVA WAR 1825-30
The Javanese, like many Asian societies, view history as cyclical and repeating, not linear as Westerners or Arabs do. You see a similar themes emerge during the 2019 Election and the Java War of 1825-30. The Java War of 1825-30 is important in explaining politics in the Javanese Homeland, because its crucible of modern Javanese "nationalism" and politics. It was the first time all segment of Javanese united in fighting a common enemy. Secondly, the Java War took place during the period (1755-1860s) that saw a unification of Javanese culture under the court culture of Surakarta-Yogyakarta, Thirdly, the laid the template for successful mobilization of the Javanese to this day.
When Indonesians study pre-Independence history, wars against the Dutch and other colonist are seen as a stepping stone to the Indonesian War of Independence. But the reality is more people died in absolute terms during the Java War than Indonesia's War of Independence from 1945-1949. One must remember the population of Central and East Java in 1825 was only 1/8 of the population of Java in 1945. During the Java War, the Dutch lost 20,000 men, more than double their deaths in the Indonesian struggle of independence. The Java War proved so costly for the Dutch, they were thinking of abandoning colonial possessions on the north coast of Central and East Java.
For our purposes, the Java War is important because it illustrates two important aspects of Javanese society that continue to this day. Javanese society is conservative, and Diponegoro was first and foremost a conservative. The cause of the Java War was the gradual break down of the arrangement between the Javanese and the Dutch from the Treaty of Giyanti in 1755 to the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies company in 1799. As Carey's points out
Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro’s war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.
The reason for the break down in the arrangement ultimately lay with the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands by Napoleon from 1795 -1813.
Secondly, in Javanese society, there are three pillars - the secular elites (traditionally the Javanese nobility). santri and their communities and the masses. There was a great deal of suspicion between the Javanese nobility and the santri. All three pillars were negatively impacted by the break down of the arrangement.
The years immediately preceding the Java War thus prepared the way for an extensive social rebellion against Dutch rule and against the ruling élite in the Yogyakarta kraton which affected all classes of Javanese society. There only remained the need to await the emergence of a leader with sufficient prestige to weld together the disparate elements into an effective alliance. Dipanagara was such a leader for he had extensive contacts with the Javanese nobility, the religious communities, and the countryside.
While some Muslims in Indonesia see the Java War, as religiously motivated, it was inspired by Javanese conservatism.
Here Diponegoro himself gave a lead by sparing Chinese and European prisoners, and by going so far as to consider making a captured Dutch official one of his principal administrators. Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.

TWO PILLARS OF JAVANESE SOCIETY

Like the Java War, the 2019 Election in Central Java, DIY and East Java could be seen conservative Javanese reaction against groups under Prabowo-Sandi's campaign like Gerindra, FPI and PKS. In this section I will talk about the first 2 pillars, secular pillar (Yogyakarta Sultanate and the PDI-P) and religious pillar (NU). In separate sections I will talk about ordinary Javanese.
SECULAR PILLAR
Hamengkubuwono X publicly remained neutral. However, it was clear from photos during Jokowi and Prabowo visits to the Kraton, the Kraton backed Jokowi. Here is a photo of Jokowi with the Sultan, the Queen consort and all the princesses, and here is a photo with Prabowo and the Sultan. Here is a photo of Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla with the Sultan during 2014 campaign, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014. As you see the photos of Jokowi with the Sultan in 2014, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014 and 2019 are the essentially the same, the Sultan met with them in side rooms and without the princesses. In 2014, the Kraton was neutral. What changed during the five years? First, the Sultan declared his eldest daughter heir apparent in 2015, going against palace norms and tradition. Secondly, Prabowo aligned himself too closely with PKS and more importantly with FPI, and these groups are more disposed to supporting the Sultan's brothers position that females can't lead the Sultanate. I think Prabowo realized this, and brought along Titiek Suharto and Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, to soften his image.
The PDI-P felt threatened by Gerindra, because Gerindra setup a lot of Posko (campaign offices) in both Central Java and Yogyakarta. They even establish their HQ in Solo, Jokowi's home town. This is what Ketua DPC PDIP Kota Semarang PDIP Hendrar Prihadi said, on Dec 12, 2018
Menurut Hendrar, rencana kubu Prabowo-Sandi yang akan membangun posko kemenangan sampai ke tingkat RT/RW, merupakan khayalan tinggi karena pembuatan posko secara masif membutuhkan biaya yang tidak sedikit."Sudah tahu belum di Jawa Tengah ada berapa desa, berapa RT-RW. Bangun posko tidak murah, biayanya besar," katanya.
Ketika posko Prabowo-Sandi berdiri, kata Hendrar, seketika kader PDIP semakin bersemangat untuk memenangkan pasangan Jokowi-Maruf. Rencana pembangunan posko pemenangan itu dikatakan cawapres nomor urut dua Sandiaga Uno untuk mengoyak mitos Jateng kandang banteng.
Without full support from BPN coalition partners, particularly PAN, PPP and Demokrat, Prabowo and Sandi were just firing blanks.
RELIGIOUS PILLAR
With NU, whether in East or Central Java, they felt threatened by Prabowo-Sandi's association with groups like FPI, and their willingness to lift the ban on HTI. During the campaign, NU took a hardline message
And their message is not a conciliatory one; rather, it’s message of “us or them”. NU and PKB leadership now propagate a kind of militant pluralism, which paints any Islamist group affiliated with Prabowo as a threat to the nation. NU’s leaders, from the national level down to local ulama on Java, Madura and, in West Nusa Tenggara, the NU and Nahdatul Wathan-affiliated Tuan Guru, have been enlisted to convince the electorate not just that Jokowi will support these traditionalist Islamic institutions and their community of santri, but also that a Prabowo victory would open the door to an Islamic caliphate, and the rise of an emboldened Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
The assumption here is the NU can dictate to its branches and masses what to do, but my view it was the ordinary Javanese and NU grassroots members in Central and East Java that pushed NU central leadership to act. Despite what the article says, I don't think any of the senior leadership in NU expected the non-Javanese NU affiliated branches would have much luck in getting their members to back Jokowi.
Non Javanese NU branches and leaders are more favorably disposed to FPI than Javanese NU branches. NU in Madura, unlike their counterparts on Java, had good relations with FPI. Mar'uf Amin stated the position of NU with regards to FPI
Mereka (FPI) juga memecahkan diri atau keluar dari kelompok NU karena menganggap NU kurang keras. Padahal bukan kurang keras, tapi NU bijak, santun untuk berjuan. Sekarang ini justru bukan antisipasi lagi, sudah ada di Indonesia, Wahabinya ada, bahkan HTI-nya, bahkan juga ada gerakan yang anak-anak kita dulunya tidak puas dengan gerakan yang kurang ekstrem dari NU, kelompok FPI,
Both NU and FPI are opposed to Wahhabi influence in Indonesia.
However, this contrast with others within NU who want FPI disbanded most notably the NU grassports organization like Banser. After FPI clash with residents in Purwakarta, West Java in 2015, NU chairman, Said Aqil Siradj called for the FPI to be disbanded. However, since the 2017 Jakarta election, FPI has penetrated deeper into East and Central Java, as well emerged from a street vigilante group to a center of Islamic and national politics challenge NU. PDI-P and NU have been aligned in past elections like Megawati - Hasyim Muzadi in 2004, and they still lost heavily to SBY in East Java, because there was no common threat to unite most of the NU branches in East and Central Java. But FPI presence became more visible in small town Java, ordinary Javanese started to worry which motivated many NU leaders to take action. The top video in youtube for FPI, which had a post in /Indonesia was a video with FPI members confronting police about them wanting to raid a supermarket in Sragen, Central Java to check if employees were wearing Christmas themed clothing. This video got 9.2 Million views, and was uploaded on Dec 21, 2016. Sragan is in right next to East Java, and is the geographic center of Central-East Java. IF you want to find a typical Javanese town, Sragen would be it. This attempted raid was followed by attempts by FPI to setup a branch in Semarang in April, 2017, which was rejected by the community.
My view is NU only had two choices -- to remain neutral or back Jokowi. Backing Prabowo was a non starter, given Jokowi popularity among his fellow Javanese and hostility of grassroots NU members in Central and East Java toward FPI. If it remained neutral, the Javanese in the home provinces would most likely vote for Jokowi anyways, and you would ended up with nothing. By negotiating with Jokowi regarding NU support, NU gots something in return. Ma'ruf was important to cover Jokowi against attacks, but NU advanced Ma'ruf as Vice President was to unify NU and get conservatives in NU to go along with what turned out to a full frontal assault against Prabowo and his hardline supporters.
After Diponegoro capture, Javanese society didn't find another leader that could unite them. Starting in the 20th century it became increasingly more difficult as Javanese society became divided on political and religious lines. These divisions culminated in the thr 1965 Anti-Communist purges. In 2019, the secular and religious pillar were united behind Jokowi, as Ganjar Pranowo said,
Kayaknya justru poskonya ditaruh di sana jadi semua semangat. Jadi semua semangat, semua bekerja dan alhamdulillah di Jawa Tengah kondusif ya bekerjanya juga cukup serius. Kelompok masyarakat, kelompok ulama, kebetulan mereka solid untuk mendukung Jokowi-Ma'ruf, maka kolaborasi kekuatan besar itu membikin suara lompatan cukup tinggi,"
PDi-P draws its support from areas which were once heavily PKI, Time has a way of healing the rifts between these people and NU. In addition, starting with Gus Dur, there has been attempt by some within NU to atone for NU involvement in 1965.
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 2 (Section 8-11)
submitted by annadpk to indonesia [link] [comments]


2019.06.06 08:52 annadpk Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part I

I really haven't been following this election unlike the 2014 and 2017 Jakarta Governor's election, but I will like to present my analysis why Prabowo legitimately thought he could win, the new challenges that faced Prabowo in 2019 and why ultimately lost. The analysis will be divided into ten sections
  1. Why Prabowo Thought He Could Win
  2. New Challenges Faced by Prabowo in 2019
  3. Prabowo's Assets In 2019 Campaign: Epitome of Tactics over Strategy
  4. Prabowo's Strategy and How Did Prabowo Do?
  5. Caught by the Javanese Tsunami
  6. Protecting the Javanese Homeland
  7. Two Pillars of Javanese Society
  8. Playing with Stereotypes
  9. Culture Clash: Indonesian Campaign vs Javanese Campaign
  10. Rising Javanese Identity
  11. Jokowi: Javanese Muse and Storyteller
  12. Conclusion
This is going to be very long, because it covers material not many people are familiar with. Jokowi is Javanese and Jokowi won because of the surge of support in the Javanese home provinces (Tanah Jawa) of Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta. Even though Jokowi is an Indonesian President, many Indonesians understand him the way a foreigner would, because they look at him as Indonesians, not as Javanese. We need to look at election in the Javanese home provinces from a Javanese perspective to really understand what went on.
Warning: This post is 11,000 words long or 20 single space pages. . I decided to do this post, because its been a long time since I written any post like this for /Indonesia. I wanted to finish this before the official election results were announced, but it took longer than expected, because I kept revising the last 5-6 sections. Since the post is over the reddot maximum post length, I broke it down into two parts.
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 1 (Sections 1-7)
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 2 (Section 8-12)

WHY PRABOWO THOUGHT HE COULD WIN

Unlike many people and the polls, I thought Prabowo had a good chance of winning. Here are some of the reasons.
The gubernatorial elections of 2017-2018, particularly Sudirman Said's results in Central Java, While Sudirman Said lost by 17%, he managed to get 42% of the vote in a PDI-P strong hold against a longstanding and popular PDP-P party member, Ganjar Pranowo. Most polls expected him to get only 20% of the vote. This race was more important than the Jakarta election for Gerindra and Prabowo, because it showed them that it was possible to do well in Central Java. Said run on a modest budget, imagine a well funded effort would do in a Presidential election. The wins in Jakarta and North Sumatra, and close finish for the so-so PKS candidate in West Java gave room for optimism.
Jusuf Kalla wasn't going to be Jokowi's running mate in 2019. In 2009, Jusuf kalla won 12% or 15 Million votes. Losing Kalla most likely cost Jokowi a couple of millions votes. Jusuf Kalla is popular in Eastern Indonesia and Aceh, and not just in Sulawesi or among the Bugis, but among many non-Bugis as well. Its why Jokowi spent a lot money on infrastructure in Sulawesi to compensate for losing Kalla in 2019.
Jokowi's so-so economic performance. During the 2014 election, Jokowi had promises 7% growth, and he only managed to deliver 5%. Also some of Jokowi's economic policies weren't well thought out. Many of the infrastructure projects, like trans Papua, had a very low rate of return, which is understandable since you are building roads in the middle of nowhere.
Declining enthusiasm among Jokowi's base as a result of failure to protect Ahok and putting on Ma'ruf Amin on the ticket. If you were to measure Siandiaga Uno and Ma'ruf Amin popularity individually, Uno does a lot better. All these factors could influence voter turnout.
Ma'ruf Amin was a compromise candidate meant to appease Jokowi's backers, both the political parties and NU. Ma'ruf selection was a political calculation to maintain NU support and unity, not electoral one. If Jokowi could get NU support and pick a better VP candidate, he would have ended doing better. Mahfud MD polled better among Muslim voters than Ma'ruf. While the press thought appointment Ma'ruf would dissuade progressive and non-Muslim from voting for Jokowi, Ma'ruf. as a high ranking NU leader actually hurt Jokowi's support among non-NU Muslims more, particularly in Sumatra.

NEW CHALLENGES FACED BY PRABOWO IN 2019

Most military officers today, including Prabowo, haven;t fought peer competitors. While going against OPM or Fretlin is dangerous, its not like trying to invade Malaysia. Prabowo-Sandi campaigning in Central and East Java, from a military standpoint is like the Indonesian army invading and penetrating deep into Malaysia.
Jokowi had the benefit of Incumbency, this is particularly important for Jokowi, who's ties to PDI-P political machinery isn't strong. For those who didn't follow the 2014 election, Jokowi's 2014 campaign was poorly organized and scheduled. Jokowi didn't have access to party infrastructure and transportation as described in this New Mandala article. The PDI-P only really supported Jokowi during the last three weeks of the campaign, when Prabowo had cut Jokowi's lead to 2-3%.
The PDI-P, PKB and other coalition parties were out in force in support of Jokowi, because first the legislative and Presidential elections were held on the same day. Secondly, this was Jokowi's last term, winning this term, means that people like Puan Maharani have a chance to compete in 2024. A Prabowo-Sandi victory could mean a possible 10-15 year wait. The PDI-P and its coalition partners were much more engaged than they were in 2014.
Jokowi and coalition partners control the governorship of all the main provinces on Java - West, Central and East Java. Even in West Java, Jokowi benefited from Ridwan Kamal being the governor. His control of the governorship prevented Jokowi from losing support as he did in other provinces that Prabowo had won in 2014 like West Sumatra and NTB.

PRABOWO'S ASSETS IN THE 2019 CAMPAIGN: EPITOME OF TACTICS OVER STRATEGY

Since Prabowo started running for the President in 2004, his endeavors have often been dominated by decisions made at the last moment and short term opportunism. Only in the Presidential Election of 2014 show a build up to the election. There are three patterns one can see from Prabowo's political career over the last decade.
Going into 2019, Prabowo was left with Gerindra, an organization with no credible senior management and limited grass roots organization. The lack of a grassroots organization, is the reason why Gerindra aligns itself with the likes of PKS and FPI. However, even the PKS and other parties at the local level in Prabowo's coalition correctly sensed something was different about this election in Central and East Java, withheld support, and focused on their own campaigns. That is why I suspect Prabowo-Sandi justification in building the Postko in Central and East Java, getting the FPI and other conservative groups involved.
Role of Sandi
Despite what people believe, I don't think he was an asset. Sandi was a compromise candidate, and his biggest advantage was he brought money. But other than that he didn't really bring additional voters, no grass roots organization and no government experience. To be honest, after this campaign Sandi is toast politically. He is a political light weight, always trying to minimize damage, but at the end he comes off looking weak. When he was called sandiwara, his mother jump to his defense. As we have the riots, there are people who are willing to kill to obtain power in Indonesia, the last thing the country need is a Mommy's boy.
As for his economic acumen, you can hire a finance minister. Every cabinet in Indonesia rotates through the same dozen economists, The reality is Sandi's economic message didn't catch on with voters in Central and East Java. because the economies of Java and the outer island are fundamentally different. Added add on culture and class, to most Javanese voters, Sandi was speaking Martian.

PRABOWO STRATEGY AND HOW DID PRABOWO DO?

Prabowo had lost the 2014 Election by 8.5 Million votes or 6.3%, or if he could swing 3.15% of the vote his way he would win. He had three factors working to his advantage in 2019. The first was Kalla wasn't in the race. The second, was the negative impact of low resource prices, this impacted the economies of resource rich provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan, impacting non-Muslims and Muslims alike. In Kalimantan, district with large Chinese and Christian majority population showed a drop in support for Jokowi compared to 2014. The third factor were new voters, who are more educated and conservative who would be voting for the first time. The factor working against Prabowo was the loss of the non-Muslim vote in non-resource provinces, particularly the minority majority provinces like NTT, Bali, North Sulawesi and Maluku.
Whatever he had gained in the outer islands, it wouldn't be enough to make up the difference. So the provinces on Java - West, East and Central Java would be critical. All Prabowo had to do was maintain his support in Javanese homeland (East, Central and Yogyakarta) and gain 1% from Jokowi in West Java, Bantan and his margins outside Java will allow him to eke out a small victory. Not altogether a unrealistic strategy, given Sudirman Said's performance in the governor's election in 2017.
For the purposes talking about the election results I am going to divide Indonesian provinces into six groups - Stable, Kalla, Resource, Javanese Homeland, non-Muslim Majority , and Outliers. The elections results can be categorized in five groups. The first are provinces that are stable. meaning their result changed by less than 5% points relative to 2014. These provinces economies also didn't show a sharp drop in per capita GDP growth like the provinces in the Resource group compare to the SBY era. The second group, are effects that benefit Prabowo, the Kalla and the resource effect The third group is the non-Muslim majority provinces. The fourth group are the Javanese homeland provinces (which also include Lampung given the majority Javanese population and very long settlement history). The last group are outliers, which include Bangka-Belitung, West Sumatra and Gorontalo. Bangka-Belitung even though its predominantly non-Javanese Muslim region, it has a long history of supporting PDI-P candidates. Megawati did better here in 2009 than she did in Central Java. Its resource economy was severely impacted by lower commodity prices, Prabowo only got 36.3% vs 32.73% in 2014. West Sumatra despite a generally healthy economy, with per capita GDP growing above 4%, Jokowi's support dropped by 10.14% points to only 12.89%. This had to do with putting Maruf Amin, an NU leader on the ticket. The last outlier, was Gorontalo, which Prabowo's support dropped from 63% to 48% even though growth in per capita GDP went from 5.89% per year to 4.87%. I still haven't figure out why Prabowo lost Gorontalo.
The first column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Provinces the same as in 2014. The second column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Province adjusted so Prabowo=Sandi's results in Central Java mirror those of Said's 2018 results. The third column contains the actual results

Provinces % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like 2014 % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like Said 2018 Actual; 2019 Results
STABLE: North Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, NTB, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua, North Kalimantan, Overseas 29,038,542 (2014: 54,29% 2019: 54.52% +124,998 votes) 29,038,542 29,038,542
KALLA: Aceh, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi 5,868,052 (2014: 38% 2019 66.10% +2,494,919 votes) 5,868,052 5,868,052
RESOURCE: Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Riau Island, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Sulawesi 10,756,042 (2014: 45.73% 2019: 54.16% +1,673,573 votes) 10,756,042 10,756,042
jAVANESE: Lampung, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta 21,878,185 23,580,062 15,568,118 (2014: 41.23% 2019: 29.81% -5,968,233 votes)
NON-MUSLIM MAJORITY: Bali, NTT, North Sulawesi and Maluku 1,236,272 (2014: 36.42% 2019: 16.21% -1,540,985 votes) 1,236,272 1,236,272
OUTLIERS Bangka Belitung, West Sumatra, Gorontalo 3,080,198 (2014: 66.97% 2019: 70.94% +181,330 votes) 3,080,198 3,080,198
TOTAL 71,857,291 (49.17%) 73,559,168 (50.30) 65.651.967 (44.85%)
If you factor our the change in results in the Javanese Homeland the election results were a lot closer than many realize. There are fors things one can take away from the election.
Had Prabowo's vote share in the Javanese home provinces remained the same as in 2014, he would gotten a very close result and would have bogged down the Constitutional Court and possibly lead to much more serious political unrest. Had he managed repeat what Said did in Central Java in 2018, he would have won with a thin margin.
Note: Here is the spreadsheet with breakdown province by province. The data for 2014, and 2019. For growth in per capita GDP was taken here. The census data on ethnicity was from this book by BPS. The data for 2019 is preliminary, abd based on real counts that are 40% complete.

CAUGHT BY THE JAVANESE TSUNAMI

Here is a table of showing the 4 provinces where the Javanese make a majority of the population, 74% of the Javanese population lives in these 4 provinces. I use the term Javanese Tsunami to draw parallels to the Malay Tsunamiin Malaysian politics.
Province Javanese as % Total Jokowi 2014 Jokowi 2019 Change
East Java 80.0% 53% 66% 13%
Central Java 97.5% 67% 77% 10%
DI Yogyakarta 95.5% 56% 69% 13%
Lampung 63.5% 53% 60% 7%
For East Java I estimate about 59% of the Javanese population voted for Jokowi in 2014, and in 2019 about 73%. Madurese make up 17.5% of East Java's population. On Madura Island where 60% of Madurese in East Java live, Prabowo got 73% of the vote. In East Java, many districts in the North have a mixed Javanese/Madurese population, looking at the preliminary data, outside the 4 districts on Madura and 1-2 districts that have a majority Madurese population, the only district that showed no shift toward Jokowi is SBY home district of Pacitan.
In Central Java, it not only caught Prabowo-Sandi by surprise, but the provincial PDI-P organization as well. Ganjar Purnomo, the Governor of Central Java, was targeting 70% of the vote in Central Java. This was reflected down to the kabupaten level, in Sragen, PDI-P officials were targeting 74%, but got 80% according to the quick count. This was a safe assumption given that Ganjar only got 58% against Said, and Jokowi was facing a much better funded campaign in 2019 than Ganjar did in 2018. I think the PDI-P assumed Jokowi path to victory would involve getting more votes among non-Javanese Muslims than he did.
There is assumption is that religious minorities and Javanese voted for similar reasons, I don't think this is valid given that most Javanese voted along similar lines as other Muslims in the Jakarta election.
NU Madurese members still voted for Prabowo like they did in 2014, while Javanese voters in Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta showed a large swing to Jokowi, particularly in areas where Jokowi lost or won by narrow margins. In Galur and Kota Gede Kecamatan in Yogyakarta, two Muhammadiyah areas, Prabowo got 55% in 2014, in 2019 he only managed 41 and 45% respectively in 2019. Muhammadiyah didn't endorse the two sides, but most Javanese members vote for Jokowi, most likely because they couldn't stand Rizieq Shibab with his self-appointed title "Imam Besar". In the three districts in Yogyakarta, Kulon Prago, Bantul and Sleman, Prabowo got 48%, 46% and 46% of the vote in 2014, in 2019 it dropped to 32%,32% and 33%. In contrast, Kota Yogyakarta which Prabowo got 40% of the vote, it only dropped to 34%. You see something similar in predominately Javanese districts in East Java, Prabowo won Gresik, East Java with 53% in 2014, he lost with 33% in 2019.
Jokowi's got about 74% of the Javanese vote in Javanese home provinces, and most likely above 70% of the Javanese vote in Javanese dominant districts in West Java like Indramayu and Subang. SBY in 2009 got about 57% of the Javanese vote in 2009. Even under the New Order, Golkar never got more than 70% of the vote in Central / East Java.
Given that there was large shifts in how Javanese voted from 2014 and 2019, one should ask "Why Did Javanese shift heavily to Jokowi in 2019?"

PROTECTING THE JAVANESE HOMELAND

The first reason why the Javanese shifted heavily to Jokowi in 2019 was important pillars of Javanese society felt threatened by a common threat (PKS, Gerindra and FPI). The mood in the Javanese homeland was of righteous indignation (atau kemarahan benar in Indonesian), which Jokowi and others on his side were able to channel.
THREATS FROM WEST JAVA
The Javanese think of power as a concentric circle, with Central-East Java at the center, and everything radiating outward. Serious threats have always come from either the North (Mongols and Japan) or from the West (Dutch). This continued after independence, from 1949-1960, the Darul Islam movement was centered in West Java, In 1998, riots moved from Medan to Jakarta than to West Java than to Central Java before petering out in Surabaya. During May Riots, Wiranto called troops from KODAM Diponegoro from Central Java to secure Jakarta, and that is why the riots lasted 48 hours. He couldn't trust Kostrad or KODAM Siliwangi, Today, you see the same "threats" from West Java in the form of Gerindra-PKS-FPI alliance in the 2019 Presidential Election. To the Javanese living in the Javanese home provinces, Jakarta isn't the center. but an outlying, unstable and problematic "territory".
The reason for this is since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda in 1500s, there has been a power and cultural vacuum in West Java. The subsequent Muslim kingdoms in West Java, whether the Cirebon or Banten Sultanates, never filled the void left by the Kingdom of Sunda for the Sundanese. The Sundanese are a people in crisis. They belonged to the Dharmic world like the Javanese-Balinese, but since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda, they have been wondering adrift,
How would your average Javanese feel when Prabowo or Sandi enters their town being escorted by FPI members? To many its like an invading army coming from the West, lead by a traitor, Prabowo. This is ironic, given that elite betrayal of the ordinary people is a common theme in Prabowo's political campaigns. Here is a video of scuffle between residents and FPI, who were guarding Prabowo in Gresik, East Java. Prabowo won Gresik in 2014, but lost heavily in 2019. You see this across East and Central Java, in predominately Javanese districts which Jokowi had lost or won with small margins in 2014, you see big shifts sometimes as much as 15-25 percentage points favoring him. The biggest difference between Sudirman Said's 2018 Campaign and Prabowo-Sandi Campaign was FPI did not have significant involvement in the Said's campaign.
Most Javanese are OK with FPI, as long as they stay away from Central Java and East Java, and don't take control of Islam nationally. The animosity toward FPI is attributed in part, because most of its top leadership are Arab Indonesians. No senior national figure talked openly about their ethnicity, until Hendropriyono open his big mouth. The thought of Rizieq Shibab, an Arab-Betawi half-breed, even getting near the Ministry of Religion, would cause many Javanese to throw up.
Why did Prabowo-Sandi allow FPI to get involved in the East-Central Java campaign?. My theory is it could be used to maintain support of FPI and other conservative groups in other regions. Prabowo and Gerindra don't have a strong grassroots, and with his supporting parties not willing to fully commit manpower to support him in East and Central Java, he was dependent on groups like the FPI.
JAVA WAR 1825-30
The Javanese, like many Asian societies, view history as cyclical and repeating, not linear as Westerners or Arabs do. You see a similar themes emerge during the 2019 Election and the Java War of 1825-30. The Java War of 1825-30 is important in explaining politics in the Javanese Homeland, because its crucible of modern Javanese "nationalism" and politics. It was the first time all segment of Javanese united in fighting a common enemy. Secondly, the Java War took place during the period (1755-1860s) that saw a unification of Javanese culture under the court culture of Surakarta-Yogyakarta, Thirdly, the laid the template for successful mobilization of the Javanese to this day.
When Indonesians study pre-Independence history, wars against the Dutch and other colonist are seen as a stepping stone to the Indonesian War of Independence. But the reality is more people died in absolute terms during the Java War than Indonesia's War of Independence from 1945-1949. One must remember the population of Central and East Java in 1825 was only 1/8 of the population of Java in 1945. During the Java War, the Dutch lost 20,000 men, more than double their deaths in the Indonesian struggle of independence. The Java War proved so costly for the Dutch, they were thinking of abandoning colonial possessions on the north coast of Central and East Java.
For our purposes, the Java War is important because it illustrates two important aspects of Javanese society that continue to this day. Javanese society is conservative, and Diponegoro was first and foremost a conservative. The cause of the Java War was the gradual break down of the arrangement between the Javanese and the Dutch from the Treaty of Giyanti in 1755 to the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies company in 1799. As Carey's points out
Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro’s war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.
The reason for the break down in the arrangement ultimately lay with the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands by Napoleon from 1795 -1813.
Secondly, in Javanese society, there are three pillars - the secular elites (traditionally the Javanese nobility). santri and their communities and the masses. There was a great deal of suspicion between the Javanese nobility and the santri. All three pillars were negatively impacted by the break down of the arrangement.
The years immediately preceding the Java War thus prepared the way for an extensive social rebellion against Dutch rule and against the ruling élite in the Yogyakarta kraton which affected all classes of Javanese society. There only remained the need to await the emergence of a leader with sufficient prestige to weld together the disparate elements into an effective alliance. Dipanagara was such a leader for he had extensive contacts with the Javanese nobility, the religious communities, and the countryside.
While some Muslims in Indonesia see the Java War, as religiously motivated, it was inspired by Javanese conservatism.
Here Diponegoro himself gave a lead by sparing Chinese and European prisoners, and by going so far as to consider making a captured Dutch official one of his principal administrators. Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.

TWO PILLARS OF JAVANESE SOCIETY

Like the Java War, the 2019 Election in Central Java, DIY and East Java could be seen conservative Javanese reaction against groups under Prabowo-Sandi's campaign like Gerindra, FPI and PKS. In this section I will talk about the first 2 pillars, secular pillar (Yogyakarta Sultanate and the PDI-P) and religious pillar (NU). In separate sections I will talk about ordinary Javanese.
SECULAR PILLAR
Hamengkubuwono X publicly remained neutral. However, it was clear from photos during Jokowi and Prabowo visits to the Kraton, the Kraton backed Jokowi. Here is a photo of Jokowi with the Sultan, the Queen consort and all the princesses, and here is a photo with Prabowo and the Sultan. Here is a photo of Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla with the Sultan during 2014 campaign, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014. As you see the photos of Jokowi with the Sultan in 2014, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014 and 2019 are the essentially the same, the Sultan met with them in side rooms and without the princesses. In 2014, the Kraton was neutral. What changed during the five years? First, the Sultan declared his eldest daughter heir apparent in 2015, going against palace norms and tradition. Secondly, Prabowo aligned himself too closely with PKS and more importantly with FPI, and these groups are more disposed to supporting the Sultan's brothers position that females can't lead the Sultanate. I think Prabowo realized this, and brought along Titiek Suharto and Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, to soften his image.
The PDI-P felt threatened by Gerindra, because Gerindra setup a lot of Posko (campaign offices) in both Central Java and Yogyakarta. They even establish their HQ in Solo, Jokowi's home town. This is what Ketua DPC PDIP Kota Semarang PDIP Hendrar Prihadi said, on Dec 12, 2018
Menurut Hendrar, rencana kubu Prabowo-Sandi yang akan membangun posko kemenangan sampai ke tingkat RT/RW, merupakan khayalan tinggi karena pembuatan posko secara masif membutuhkan biaya yang tidak sedikit."Sudah tahu belum di Jawa Tengah ada berapa desa, berapa RT-RW. Bangun posko tidak murah, biayanya besar," katanya.
Ketika posko Prabowo-Sandi berdiri, kata Hendrar, seketika kader PDIP semakin bersemangat untuk memenangkan pasangan Jokowi-Maruf. Rencana pembangunan posko pemenangan itu dikatakan cawapres nomor urut dua Sandiaga Uno untuk mengoyak mitos Jateng kandang banteng.
Without full support from BPN coalition partners, particularly PAN, PPP and Demokrat, Prabowo and Sandi were just firing blanks.
RELIGIOUS PILLAR
With NU, whether in East or Central Java, they felt threatened by Prabowo-Sandi's association with groups like FPI, and their willingness to lift the ban on HTI. During the campaign, NU took a hardline message
And their message is not a conciliatory one; rather, it’s message of “us or them”. NU and PKB leadership now propagate a kind of militant pluralism, which paints any Islamist group affiliated with Prabowo as a threat to the nation. NU’s leaders, from the national level down to local ulama on Java, Madura and, in West Nusa Tenggara, the NU and Nahdatul Wathan-affiliated Tuan Guru, have been enlisted to convince the electorate not just that Jokowi will support these traditionalist Islamic institutions and their community of santri, but also that a Prabowo victory would open the door to an Islamic caliphate, and the rise of an emboldened Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
The assumption here is the NU can dictate to its branches and masses what to do, but my view it was the ordinary Javanese and NU grassroots members in Central and East Java that pushed NU central leadership to act. Despite what the article says, I don't think any of the senior leadership in NU expected the non-Javanese NU affiliated branches would have much luck in getting their members to back Jokowi.
Non Javanese NU branches and leaders are more favorably disposed to FPI than Javanese NU branches. NU in Madura, unlike their counterparts on Java, had good relations with FPI. Mar'uf Amin stated the position of NU with regards to FPI
Mereka (FPI) juga memecahkan diri atau keluar dari kelompok NU karena menganggap NU kurang keras. Padahal bukan kurang keras, tapi NU bijak, santun untuk berjuan. Sekarang ini justru bukan antisipasi lagi, sudah ada di Indonesia, Wahabinya ada, bahkan HTI-nya, bahkan juga ada gerakan yang anak-anak kita dulunya tidak puas dengan gerakan yang kurang ekstrem dari NU, kelompok FPI,
Both NU and FPI are opposed to Wahhabi influence in Indonesia.
However, this contrast with others within NU who want FPI disbanded most notably the NU grassports organization like Banser. After FPI clash with residents in Purwakarta, West Java in 2015, NU chairman, Said Aqil Siradj called for the FPI to be disbanded. However, since the 2017 Jakarta election, FPI has penetrated deeper into East and Central Java, as well emerged from a street vigilante group to a center of Islamic and national politics challenge NU. PDI-P and NU have been aligned in past elections like Megawati - Hasyim Muzadi in 2004, and they still lost heavily to SBY in East Java, because there was no common threat to unite most of the NU branches in East and Central Java. But FPI presence became more visible in small town Java, ordinary Javanese started to worry which motivated many NU leaders to take action. The top video in youtube for FPI, which had a post in /Indonesia was a video with FPI members confronting police about them wanting to raid a supermarket in Sragen, Central Java to check if employees were wearing Christmas themed clothing. This video got 9.2 Million views, and was uploaded on Dec 21, 2016. Sragan is in right next to East Java, and is the geographic center of Central-East Java. IF you want to find a typical Javanese town, Sragen would be it. This attempted raid was followed by attempts by FPI to setup a branch in Semarang in April, 2017, which was rejected by the community.
My view is NU only had two choices -- to remain neutral or back Jokowi. Backing Prabowo was a non starter, given Jokowi popularity among his fellow Javanese and hostility of grassroots NU members in Central and East Java toward FPI. If it remained neutral, the Javanese in the home provinces would most likely vote for Jokowi anyways, and you would ended up with nothing. By negotiating with Jokowi regarding NU support, NU gots something in return. Ma'ruf was important to cover Jokowi against attacks, but NU advanced Ma'ruf as Vice President was to unify NU and get conservatives in NU to go along with what turned out to a full frontal assault against Prabowo and his hardline supporters.
After Diponegoro capture, Javanese society didn't find another leader that could unite them. Starting in the 20th century it became increasingly more difficult as Javanese society became divided on political and religious lines. These divisions culminated in the thr 1965 Anti-Communist purges. In 2019, the secular and religious pillar were united behind Jokowi, as Ganjar Pranowo said,
Kayaknya justru poskonya ditaruh di sana jadi semua semangat. Jadi semua semangat, semua bekerja dan alhamdulillah di Jawa Tengah kondusif ya bekerjanya juga cukup serius. Kelompok masyarakat, kelompok ulama, kebetulan mereka solid untuk mendukung Jokowi-Ma'ruf, maka kolaborasi kekuatan besar itu membikin suara lompatan cukup tinggi,"
PDi-P draws its support from areas which were once heavily PKI, Time has a way of healing the rifts between these people and NU. In addition, starting with Gus Dur, there has been attempt by some within NU to atone for NU involvement in 1965.

Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 2 (Section 8-12)
submitted by annadpk to u/annadpk [link] [comments]


2019.06.06 04:16 annadpk Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 1

I really haven't been following this election unlike the 2014 and 2017 Jakarta Governor's election, but I will like to present my analysis why Prabowo legitimately thought he could win, the new challenges that faced Prabowo in 2019 and why ultimately lost. The analysis will be divided into ten sections
  1. Why Prabowo Thought He Could Win
  2. New Challenges Faced by Prabowo in 2019
  3. Prabowo's Assets In 2019 Campaign: Epitome of Tactics over Strategy
  4. Prabowo's Strategy and How Did Prabowo Do?
  5. Caught by the Javanese Tsunami
  6. Protecting the Javanese Homeland
  7. Two Pillars of Javanese Society
  8. Playing with Stereotypes
  9. Culture Clash: Indonesian Campaign vs Javanese Campaign
  10. Rising Javanese Identity
  11. Jokowi: Javanese Muse and Storyteller
  12. Conclusion
This is going to be very long, because it covers material not many people are familiar with. Jokowi is Javanese and Jokowi won because of the surge of support in the Javanese home provinces (Tanah Jawa) of Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta. Even though Jokowi is an Indonesian President, many Indonesians understand him the way a foreigner would, because they look at him as Indonesians, not as Javanese. We need to look at election in the Javanese home provinces from a Javanese perspective to really understand what went on.
Warning: This post is 13,000 words long or 25 single space pages. . I decided to do this post, because its been a long time since I written any post like this for /Indonesia. I am not assigned to any research institute, I just do this because it interest me, and because a lot of the coverage and analysis were superficial. I wanted to finish this before the official election results were announced, but it took longer than expected, because I kept revising the last 5-6 sections. Since the post is over the reddot maximum post length, I broke it down into three sections
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 1
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 2
Why Prabowo-Sandi Lost: Caught by the Javanese Tsunami Part 3

WHY PRABOWO THOUGHT HE COULD WIN

Unlike many people and the polls, I thought Prabowo had a good chance of winning. Here are some of the reasons.
The gubernatorial elections of 2017-2018, particularly Sudirman Said's results in Central Java, While Sudirman Said lost by 17%, he managed to get 42% of the vote in a PDI-P strong hold against a longstanding and popular PDP-P party member, Ganjar Pranowo. Most polls expected him to get only 20% of the vote. This race was more important than the Jakarta election for Gerindra and Prabowo, because it showed them that it was possible to do well in Central Java. Said run on a modest budget, imagine a well funded effort would do in a Presidential election. The wins in Jakarta and North Sumatra, and close finish for the so-so PKS candidate in West Java gave room for optimism.
Jusuf Kalla wasn't going to be Jokowi's running mate in 2019. In 2009, Jusuf kalla won 12% or 15 Million votes. Losing Kalla most likely cost Jokowi a couple of millions votes. Jusuf Kalla is popular in Eastern Indonesia and Aceh, and not just in Sulawesi or among the Bugis, but among many non-Bugis as well. Its why Jokowi spent a lot money on infrastructure in Sulawesi to compensate for losing Kala in 2019. Kalla's support in Sulawesi also took a hit in 2018, because of the Munafri Arifuddin scandal
Jokowi's so-so economic performance. During the 2014 election, Jokowi had promises 7%, and he only managed to deliver 5%. Also some of Jokowi's economic policies weren't well thought out. Many of the infrastructure projects, trans Papua, had a very low rate of return, which is understandable since you are building roads in the middle of nowhere.
Declining enthusiasm among Jokowi's base as a result of failure to protect Ahok and putting on Ma'ruf Amin on the ticket. If you were to measure Siandiaga Uno and Ma'ruf Amin popularity individually, Uno does a lot better. All these factors would influence voter turnout.
Ma'ruf Amin was a compromise candidate meant to appease Jokowi's backers, both the political parties and NU. Ma'ruf selection was a political calculation to maintain NU support and unity, not electoral one. If Jokowi could get NU support and pick a better VP candidate, he would have ended doing better. Mahfud MD polled better among Muslim voters than Ma'ruf. While the press thought that appointment Ma'ruf would dissuade progressive and non-Muslim from voting for Jokowi, Ma'ruf. as a high ranking NU member hurt Jokowi's support among non-NU Muslims, particularly in Sumatra.

NEW CHALLENGES FACED BY PRABOWO IN 2019

Most military officers today, including Prabowo, don't fight peer competitors. While going against OPM or Fretlin is dangerous, its not like trying to invade Malaysia. Prabowo-Sandi campaigning in Central and East Java, from a political standpoint is like the Indonesian army invading and penetrating deep into Malaysia.
Jokowi had the benefit of Incumbency, this is particularly important for Jokowi, who's ties to PDI-P political machinery isn't strong. For those who didn't follow the 2014 election, Jokowi's 2014 campaign was poorly organized and scheduled. Jokowi didn't have access to party infrastructure and transportation as described in this New Mandala article. The PDI-P only really supportws Jokowi during the last three weeks of the campaign, when Prabowo had cut Jokowi's lead to 2-3%.
The PDI-P, PKB and other coalition parties were out in force in support of Jokowi, because first the legislative and Presidential elections were held on the same day. Secondly, this was Jokowi's last term, winning this term, means that people like Puan Maharani have a chance to compete in 2024. A Prabowo-Sandi victory could mean a possible 10-15 year wait. The PDI-P and its coalition partners were much more engaged than they were in 2014.
Jokowi and coalition partners control the governorship of all the main provinces on Java - West, Central and East Java. Even in West Java, Jokowi benefited from Ridwan Kamal being the governor. His control of the governorship prevented Jokowi from losing support as he did in other provinces that Prabowo had won in 2014 like West Sumatra and NTB.
Unlike with Sudirman Said coalition in the 2018 Governor's election which consisted of Gerindra, PKS, PKB and PAN, Prabowo-Sandi coalition wasn't solid particularly Demokrat, PAN and PPP. They were more interested in the legislative elections than helping Prabowo win the Presidency.

PRABOWO'S ASSETS IN THE 2019 CAMPAIGN: EPITOME OF TACTICS OVER STRATEGY

Since Prabowo started running for the President in 2004, his endeavors have often been dominated by decisions made at the last moment and short term opportunism. Only in the Presidential Election of 2014 show a build up to the election. There are three patterns one can see from Prabowo's political career over the last decade.
Going into 2019, Prabowo was left with Gerindra, an organization with no credible senior management and limited grass roots organization. The lack of a grassroots organization, is the reason why Gerindra aligns itself with the likes of PKS and FPI. However, even the PKS and other parties at the local level in Prabowo's coalition correctly sensed something was different about this election in Central and East Java, withheld support, and focused on their own campaigns. That is why I suspect Prabowo-Sandi justification in building the Postko in Central and East Java, getting the FPI and other conservative groups involved.
Role of Sandi
Despite what people believe, I don't think he was an asset. Sandi was a compromise candidate, and his biggest advantage was he brought money. But other than that he didn't really bring additional voters, no grass roots organization and no government experience. To be honest, after this campaign Sandi is toast politically. He is a political light weight, always trying to minimize damage, but at the end he comes off looking weak. Even when he was called sandiwara, his mother jump to his defense.
As for his economic acumen, you can hire a finance minister, and that is what they are there for. Every cabinet in Indonesia rotates through the same dozen economist, The reality is Sandi's economic message didn't catch on with voters in Central and East Java. because the economies of Java and the outer island are fundamentally different. Added add on religion, culture and class, to most Javanese voters, Sandi was speaking Martian.

PRABOWO STRATEGY AND HOW DID PRABOWO DO?

Prabowo had lost the 2014 Election by 8.5 Million votes or 6.3%, or if he could swing 3.15% of the vote his way he would win. He had three factors working to his advantage in 2019. The first was Kalla wasn't in the race. The second, was the negative impact of low resource prices, this impacted the economies of resource rich provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan, this impacted non-Muslims and Muslims alike. In Kalimantan, district with large Chinese and Christian majority population they showed a drop in support for Jokowi compared to 2014. The third factor were new voters, who are more educated and conservative who would be voting for the first time. The factor working against Prabowo was the loss of the non-Muslim vote in non-resource provinces, particularly the minority majority provinces like NTT, Bali, North Sulawesi and Maluku. Prabowo won about 30% of this vote in 2014, and most likely got 15% in 2019 based on surveys.
Whatever he had gained in the outer islands, it wouldn't be enough to make up the difference. So the provinces on Java - West, East and Central Java would be critical. All Prabowo had to do was maintain his support in Javanese homeland (East, Central and Yogyakarta) and gain 1% from Jokowi in West Java, Bantan and his margins outside Java will allow him to eke out a small victory. Not altogether a unrealistic strategy, given Sudirman Said's performance in the governor's election in 2017.
For the purposes talking about the election results I am going to divide Indonesian provinces into six groups - Stable, Kalla, Resource, Javanese Homeland, non-Muslim Majority , and Outliers. The elections results can be categorized in five groups. The first are provinces that are stable. meaning their result changed by less than 5% points relative to 2014. These provinces economies also didn't show a sharp drop in per capita GDP growth like the provinces in the Resource group compare to the SBY era. The second group, are effects that benefit Prabowo, the Kalla and the resource effect The third group is the non-Muslim majority provinces. The fourth group are the Javanese homeland provinces (which also include Lampung given the majority Javanese population and very long settlement history). The last group are outliers, which include Bangka-Belitung, West Sumatra and Gorontalo. Bangka-Belitung even though its predominantly non-Javanese Muslim region, it has a long history of supporting PDI-P candidates. Megawati did better here in 2009 than she did in Central Java. Its resource economy was severely impacted by lower commodity prices, Prabowo only got 36.3% vs 32.73% in 2014. West Sumatra despite a generally healthy economy, with per capita GDP growing above 4%, Jokowi's support dropped by 10.14% points to only 12.89%. This had to do with putting Maruf Amin, an NU leader on the ticket. The last outlier, was Gorontalo, which Prabowo's support dropped from 63% to 48% even though growth in per capita GDP went from 5.89% per year to 4.87%. I still haven't figure out why Prabowo lost Gorontalo.
The first column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Provinces the same as in 2014. The second column shows the 2019 Elections Results with the Prabowo's share of the vote in the Javanese Home Province adjusted so Prabowo=Sandi's results in Central Java mirror those of Said's 2018 results. The third column contains the actual results

Provinces % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like 2014 % of Votes in Javanese Provinces like Said 2018 Actual; 2019 Results
STABLE: North Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, NTB, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua, North Kalimantan, Overseas 29,038,542 (2014: 54,29% 2019: 54.52% +124,998 votes) 29,038,542 29,038,542
KALLA: Aceh, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi 5,868,052 (2014: 38% 2019 66.10% +2,494,919 votes) 5,868,052 5,868,052
RESOURCE: Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Riau Island, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Sulawesi 10,756,042 (2014: 45.73% 2019: 54.16% +1,673,573 votes) 10,756,042 10,756,042
jAVANESE: Lampung, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta 21,878,185 23,580,062 15,568,118 (2014: 41.23% 2019: 29.81% -5,968,233 votes)
NON-MUSLIM MAJORITY: Bali, NTT, North Sulawesi and Maluku 1,236,272 (2014: 36.42% 2019: 16.21% -1,540,985 votes) 1,236,272 1,236,272
OUTLIERS Bangka Belitung, West Sumatra, Gorontalo 3,080,198 (2014: 66.97% 2019: 70.94% +181,330 votes) 3,080,198 3,080,198
TOTAL 71,857,291 (49.17%) 73,559,168 (50.30) 65.651.967 (44.85%)
If you factor our the change in results in the Javanese Homeland the election results were a lot closer than many realize. There are three things one can take away from the election.
Despite what many said before the election, most Prabowo voters not impacted by a drop in commodity prices would accept a Jokowi victory, and its why for example you see a small shift in Sundanese dominant districts in West Java for Prabowo. The big shifts came among the Javanese and non-Muslims not impacted by a drop in commodity price, of which the shift in Javanese in favor of Jokowi proved decisive in Prabowo's loss.
Had Prabowo's vote share in the Javanese home provinces remained the same as in 2014, he would gotten a very close result would have bogged down the Constitutional Court and possibly lead to much more serious political unrest. Had he managed repeat what Said did in Central Java in 2018, he would have won with a thin margin.
Note: Here is the spreadsheet with breakdown province by province. The data for 2014, and 2019. For growth in per capita GDP was taken here. The census data on ethnicity was from this book by BPS. The data for 2019 is preliminary, abd based on real counts that are 40% complete.

CAUGHT BY THE JAVANESE TSUNAMI

Here is a table of showing the 4 provinces where the Javanese make a majority of the population, 74% of the Javanese population lives in these 4 provinces.
Province Javanese as % Total Jokowi 2014 Jokowi 2019 Change
East Java 80.0% 53% 66% 13%
Central Java 97.5% 67% 77% 10%
DI Yogyakarta 95.5% 56% 69% 13%
Lampung 63.5% 53% 60% 7%
For East Java I estimate about 58% of the Javanese population voted for Jokowi in 2014, and in 2019 about 73%. Madurese make up 17.5% of East Java's population. On Madura Island where 60% of Madurese in East Java live, Prabowo got 73% of the vote. In East Java, many districts in the North have a mixed Javanese/Madurese population, looking at the preliminary data, outside the 4 districts on Madura and 1-2 districts that have a majority Madurese population, the only district that showed no shift toward Jokowi is SBY home district of Pacitan.
In Central Java, it not only caught Prabowo-Sandi by surprise, but the provincial PDI-P organization as well. Although, Jokowi targeted to get 80% of the vote in Central Java, Ganjar Purnomo, the Governor of Central Java, was targeting 70% of the vote in Central Java. This was reflected down to the kabupaten level, in Sragen, PDI-P officials were targeting 74%, but got 80% according to the quick count. This was a safe assumption given that Ganjar only got 58% against Said, and Jokowi was facing a much better funded campaign in 2019 than Ganjar did in 2018. I think the PDI-P assumed Jokowi path to victory would involve getting more votes among non-Javanese Muslims than he did.
There is assumption is that religious minorities and Javanese voted for similar reasons, I don't think is valid given that most Javanese voted along similar lines as other Muslims in the Jakarta election.
NU Madurese members still voted for Prabowo like they did in 2014, while Javanese voters in Central Java, East Java and Yogyakarta showed a large swing to Jokowi, particularly in areas where Jokowi lost or won by narrow margins. In Galur and Kota Gede Kecamatan in Yogyakarta, two Muhammadiyah areas, Prabowo got 55% in 2014, in 2019 he only managed 41 and 45% respectively in 2019. Muhammadiyah didn't endorse the two sides, but most Javanese members vote for Jokowi, most likely because they couldn't stand Rizieq Shibab with his self-appointed title "Imam Besar". In the three districts in Yogyakarta, Kulon Prago, Bantul and Sleman, Prabowo got 48%, 46% and 46% of the vote in 2014, in 2019 it dropped to 32%,32% and 33%. In contrast, Kota Yogyakarta which Prabowo got 40% of the vote, it only dropped to 34%. You see something similar in predominately Javanese districts in East Java, Prabowo won Gresik, East Java with 53% in 2014, he lost with 33% in 2019.
Jokowi's got about 74% of the Javanese vote in Javanese home provinces, and most likely above 70% of the Javanese vote in Javanese dominant districts in West Java like Indramayu and Subang. SBY in 2009 got about 57% of the Javanese vote 2009. Even under the New Order, Golkar never got more than 70% of the vote in Central / East Java.
Given that there was large shifts in how Javanese voted from 2014 and 2019, one should ask "Why Did Javanese shift heavily to Jokowi in 2019?"

PROTECTING THE JAVANESE HOMELAND

The first reason why the Javanese shifted heavily to Jokowi in 2019 was important pillars of Javanese society felt threatened by a common threat (PKS, Gerindra and FPI). The mood in the Javanese homeland was of righteous indignation (atau kemarahan benar in Indonesian), which Jokowi and others on his side were able to channel.
THREATS FROM WEST JAVA
Traditionally, the Javanese think of power as a concentric circle, with Central-East Java at the center, and everything radiating outward. Serious threats have always come from either the North (Mongols and Japan) or from the West (Dutch). This continued after independence, from 1949-1960, the Darul Islam movement was centered in West Java, In 1998, riots moved from Medan to Jakarta than to West Java than to Central Java before petering out in Surabaya. During May Riots, Wiranto called troops from KODAM Diponegoro from Central Java to secure Jakarta, and that is why the riots lasted 48 hours. He couldn't trust Kostrad or KODAM Siliwangi, Today, you see the same "threats" from West Java in the form of Gerindra-PKS-FPI alliance in the 2019 Presidential Election. To the Javanese living in the Javanese home provinces, Jakarta isn't the center. but an outlying, unstable and problematic "territory".
The reason for this is since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda in 1500s, there has been a power and cultural vacuum in West Java. The subsequent Muslim kingdoms in West Java, whether the Cirebon or Banten Sultanates, never filled the void left by the Kingdom of Sunda for the Sundanese. The Sundanese are a people in crisis. They belonged to the Dharmic world like the Javanese-Balinese, but since the fall of the Kingdom of Sunda, they have been wondering adrift,
How would your average Javanese feel when Prabowo or Sandi enters their town being escorted by FPI members? To many its like an invading army coming from the West, lead by a traitor, Prabowo. This is ironic, given that elite betrayal of the ordinary people is a common theme in Prabowo's political campaigns. Here is a video of scuffle between residents and FPI, who were guarding Prabowo in Gresik, East Java. Prabowo won Gresik in 2014, but lost heavily in 2019. You see this across East and Central Java, in predominately Javanese districts which Jokowi had lost or won with small margins in 2014, you see big shifts sometimes as much as 15-25 percentage points favoring him. The biggest difference between Sudirman Said's 2018 Campaign and Prabowo-Sandi Campaign was FPI did not have significant involvement in the Said's campaign.
Most Javanese are OK with FPI, as long as they stay away from Central Java and East Java, and don't take control of Islam nationally. The animosity toward FPI is attributed in part, because most of its top leadership are Arab Indonesians. No senior national figure talked openly about their ethnicity, until Hendropriyono open his big mouth. The thought of Rizieq Shibab, an Arab-Betawi half-breed, even getting near the Ministry of Religion, would cause many Javanese to throw up.
Why did Prabowo-Sandi allow FPI to get involved in the East-Central Java campaign?. My theory is it could be used to maintain support of FPI and other conservative groups in other regions. Prabowo and Gerindra don't have a strong grassroots, and with his supporting parties not willing to fully commit manpower to support him in East and Central Java, he was dependent on groups like the FPI.
JAVA WAR 1825-30
The Javanese, like many Asian societies, view history as cyclical and repeating, not linear as Westerners or Arabs do. You see a similar themes emerge during the 2019 Election and the Java War of 1825-30. The Java War of 1825-30 is important in explaining politics in the Javanese Homeland, because its crucible of modern Javanese "nationalism" and politics. It was the first time all segment of Javanese united in fighting a common enemy. Secondly, the Java War took place during the period (1755-1860s) that saw a unification of Javanese culture under the court culture of Surakarta-Yogyakarta, Thirdly, the laid the template for successful mobilization of the Javanese to this day.
When Indonesians study pre-Independence history, wars against the Dutch and other colonist are seen as a stepping stone to the Indonesian War of Independence. But the reality is more people died in absolute terms during the Java War than Indonesia's War of Independence from 1945-1949. One must remember the population of Central and East Java in 1825 was only 1/8 of the population of Java in 1945. During the Java War, the Dutch lost 20,000 men, more than double their deaths in the Indonesian struggle of independence. The Java War proved so costly for the Dutch, they were thinking of abandoning colonial possessions on the north coast of Central and East Java.
For our purposes, the Java War is important because it illustrates two important aspects of Javanese society that continue to this day. Javanese society is conservative, and Diponegoro was first and foremost a conservative. The cause of the Java War was the gradual break down of the arrangement between the Javanese and the Dutch from the Treaty of Giyanti in 1755 to the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies company in 1799. As Carey's points out
Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro’s war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.
The reason for the break down in the arrangement ultimately lay with the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands by Napoleon from 1795 -1813.
Secondly, in Javanese society, there are three pillars - the secular elites (traditionally the Javanese nobility). santri and their communities and the masses. There was a great deal of suspicion between the Javanese nobility and the santri. All three pillars were negatively impacted by the break down of the arrangement.
The years immediately preceding the Java War thus prepared the way for an extensive social rebellion against Dutch rule and against the ruling élite in the Yogyakarta kraton which affected all classes of Javanese society. There only remained the need to await the emergence of a leader with sufficient prestige to weld together the disparate elements into an effective alliance. Dipanagara was such a leader for he had extensive contacts with the Javanese nobility, the religious communities, and the countryside.
While some Muslims in Indonesia see the Java War, as religiously motivated, it was inspired by Javanese conservatism.
Here Diponegoro himself gave a lead by sparing Chinese and European prisoners, and by going so far as to consider making a captured Dutch official one of his principal administrators. Later, in his peace proposals which he transmitted to the Dutch through one of his army commanders, he expressed the hope that the Dutch would remain as settlers and traders in Java provided that they agreed to live on the north coast (pasisir). This was possibly in keeping with the traditional Javanese kraton view, which held that the Dutch were legitimate co-rulers in Java as the descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. There was much then in Diponegoro war aims which hankered for a revival of the old political system which had been in force before Daendels’s period of administration.

TWO PILLARS OF JAVANESE SOCIETY

Like the Java War, the 2019 Election in Central Java, DIY and East Java could be seen conservative Javanese reaction against groups under Prabowo-Sandi's campaign like Gerindra, FPI and PKS. In this section I will talk about the first 2 pillars, secular pillar (Yogyakarta Sultanate and the PDI-P) and religious pillar (NU). In separate sections I will talk about ordinary Javanese.

SECULAR PILLAR
Hamengkubuwono X publicly remained neutral. However, it was clear from photos during Jokowi and Prabowo visits to the Kraton, the Kraton backed Jokowi. Here is a photo of Jokowi with the Sultan, the Queen consort and all the princesses, and here is a photo with Prabowo and the Sultan. Here is a photo of Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla with the Sultan during 2014 campaign, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014. As you see the photos of Jokowi with the Sultan in 2014, and Prabowo with the Sultan in 2014 and 2019 are the essentially the same, the Sultan met with them in side rooms and without the princesses. In 2014, the Kraton was neutral. What changed during the five years? First, the Sultan declared his eldest daughter heir apparent in 2015, going against palace norms and tradition. Secondly, Prabowo aligned himself too closely with the PKS and more importantly with FPI, and these groups are more disposed to supporting the Sultan's brothers position that females can't lead the Sultanate. I think Prabowo realized this, and brought along Titiek Suharto and Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, to soften his image.
The PDI-P felt threatened by Gerindra, because Gerindra setup a lot of Posko (campaign offices) in both Central Java and Yogyakarta. They even establish their HQ in Solo, Jokowi's home town. This is what Ketua DPC PDIP Kota Semarang PDIP Hendrar Prihadi said, on Dec 12, 2018
Menurut Hendrar, rencana kubu Prabowo-Sandi yang akan membangun posko kemenangan sampai ke tingkat RT/RW, merupakan khayalan tinggi karena pembuatan posko secara masif membutuhkan biaya yang tidak sedikit."Sudah tahu belum di Jawa Tengah ada berapa desa, berapa RT-RW. Bangun posko tidak murah, biayanya besar," katanya.
Ketika posko Prabowo-Sandi berdiri, kata Hendrar, seketika kader PDIP semakin bersemangat untuk memenangkan pasangan Jokowi-Maruf. Rencana pembangunan posko pemenangan itu dikatakan cawapres nomor urut dua Sandiaga Uno untuk mengoyak mitos Jateng kandang banteng.
Without full support from BPN coalition partners, particularly PAN, PPP and Demokrat, Prabowo and Sandi were just firing blanks.

RELIGIOUS PILLAR
With NU, whether in East or Central Java, they felt threatened by Prabowo-Sandi's association with groups like FPI, and their willingness to lift the ban on HTI. During the campaign, NU took a hardline message
And their message is not a conciliatory one; rather, it’s message of “us or them”. NU and PKB leadership now propagate a kind of militant pluralism, which paints any Islamist group affiliated with Prabowo as a threat to the nation. NU’s leaders, from the national level down to local ulama on Java, Madura and, in West Nusa Tenggara, the NU and Nahdatul Wathan-affiliated Tuan Guru, have been enlisted to convince the electorate not just that Jokowi will support these traditionalist Islamic institutions and their community of santri, but also that a Prabowo victory would open the door to an Islamic caliphate, and the rise of an emboldened Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
The assumption here is the NU can dictate to its branches and masses what to do, but my view it was the ordinary Javanese and NU grassroots members in Central and East Java that pushed NU central leadership to act. Despite what the article says, I don't think any of the senior leadership in NU expected the non-Javanese NU affiliated branches would have much luck in getting their members to back Jokowi.
Non Javanese NU branches and leaders are more favorably disposed to FPI than Javanese NU branches. NU in Madura, unlike their counterparts on Java, had good relations with FPI. Mar'uf Amin stated the position of NU with regards to FPI
Mereka (FPI) juga memecahkan diri atau keluar dari kelompok NU karena menganggap NU kurang keras. Padahal bukan kurang keras, tapi NU bijak, santun untuk berjuan. Sekarang ini justru bukan antisipasi lagi, sudah ada di Indonesia, Wahabinya ada, bahkan HTI-nya, bahkan juga ada gerakan yang anak-anak kita dulunya tidak puas dengan gerakan yang kurang ekstrem dari NU, kelompok FPI,
Both NU and FPI are opposed to Wahhabi influence in Indonesia.
However, this contrast with others within NU who want FPI disbanded most notably the NU grassports organization like Banser. After FPI clash with residents in Purwakarta, West Java in 2015, NU chairman, Said Aqil Siradj called for the FPI to be disbanded. However, since the 2017 Jakarta election, FPI has penetrated deeper into East and Central Java, as well emerged from a street vigilante group to a center of Islamic and national politics challenge NU. PDI-P and NU have been aligned in past elections like Megawati - Hasyim Muzadi in 2004, and they still lost heavily to SBY in East Java, because there was no common threat to united most of the NU branches in East and Central Java. But FPI presence became more visible in small town Java, ordinary Javanese started to worry which motivated many NU leaders to take action. The top video in youtube for FPI, which had a post in /Indonesia was a video with FPI members confronting police about them wanting to raid a supermarket in Sragen, Central Java to check if employees were wearing Christmas themed clothing. This video got 9.2 Million views, and was uploaded on Dec 21, 2016. Sragan is in right next to East Java, and is in geographic center of Central-East Java. This attempted raid was followed by attempts by FPI to setup a branch in Semarang in April, 2017, which was rejected by the community.
My view is NU only had two choices to remain neutral or back Jokowi. Backing Prabowo was a non starter, given Jokowi popularity among his fellow Javanese and hostility of grassroots NU members in Central and East Java toward FPI. If it remained neutral, the Javanese in the home provinces would most likely vote for Jokowi anyways, and you would ended up with nothing. By negotiating with Jokowi regarding NU support, NU gots something in return. Ma'ruf was important to cover Jokowi against attacks, but NU advanced Ma'ruf as Vice President was to unify NU and get conservatives in NU to go along with what turned out to a full frontal assault against Prabowo and his hardline supporters.
After Diponegoro capture, Javanese society didn't find another leader that could unite them. Starting in the 20th century it became increasingly more difficult as Javanese society became divided on political and religious lines. These divisions culminated in the thr 1965 Anti-Communist purges. In 2019, the secular and religious pillar were united behind Jokowi, as Ganjar Purnowo said,
Kayaknya justru poskonya ditaruh di sana jadi semua semangat. Jadi semua semangat, semua bekerja dan alhamdulillah di Jawa Tengah kondusif ya bekerjanya juga cukup serius. Kelompok masyarakat, kelompok ulama, kebetulan mereka solid untuk mendukung Jokowi-Ma'ruf, maka kolaborasi kekuatan besar itu membikin suara lompatan cukup tinggi,"
PDi-P draws its same support from areas that were once heavily PKI, Time has a way of healing the rifts between these people and NU. In addition, starting with Gus Dur, there has been attempt by some within NU to atone for NU involvement in 1965.
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2016.11.14 14:25 shoe4561 [H] StatTrak / ST Flip Doppler P2 Max Pink [W] 64 Keys

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2015.03.29 01:49 muigleb Separate Paths - Wiki

Races
 
Races of the Perseus Interspecies Alliance
 
Species: Humanity – The Belgian Kingdom Home world: Belgium Description: Humans. Founding member of the Perseus Interspecies Alliance (PITA)
 
Species: Luvendorg Home world: Ugelsia V Description: A race of genderless humanoids who are governed by a religious hierarchy. They have extremely large and irregular feet and can never find a comfortable pair of shoes. When their home-world was rendered uninhabitable due to an environmental catastrophe, they terraformed a nearby planet in their star system, making it their new home.
 
Species: Tugeorg Home world: Amerath VIII Description: A benevolent race, which holds art above all else. They have latent telepathic abilities and live in the thick atmosphere of a carbon dioxide rich gas giant. They are obsessed with all things human, and they buy human clothes in order to look more like us.
 
Species: Dilgarians Home world: Gordia VI Description: A race of cybernetic reptiles who like the cold. Their culture is highly competitive and places a great deal of emphasis on competitive sports and games. Most individuals play some form of sport, whether it is physical or intellectual. Contact sports are extremely popular, as are games of strategy. Their national sport, Taumub, combines both. It involves two teams fighting for control of three flags in a continually changing maze-like arena.
 
Species: Molovians Home world: Malt Prime Description: A bipedal species with slender bodies and large antlers. They are extremely prudish. Many of their technological advancements are in the field of negative energy manipulation.
 
Species: Quonoans Home world: Fideon VII Description: A race of humanoids. They increase in size when threatened and naturally produce a chemical that can be used to increase the life-span of other races. Because of this, other races have repeatedly attempted to invade their world. One of these attempts had been successful; the Gorgananmorane enslaved their race for over two hundred years before being overthrown.
 
Species: Ubacians Home world: Ubacia 4 Description: A race of humanoid aliens who have one-way digestive systems and purple skin. Sex is extremely important in their society, and is used as a form of social ranking. Highly successful individuals who are deemed to contribute more to society are permitted to have multiple spouses, while ordinary citizens are only permitted to have one. Taking more sexual partners than your social rank permits is a criminal offense and is punishable by castration. They find humans exotic, especially more so when they realised humans have sex with partners without any commitments, which they could indulge in on human worlds as they weren't subject to Ubacian law.
 
Species: Teegafane Home world: Eden Description: A race of serene, tree-like organisms. They feel no pain. They evolved in another galaxy. No further information is known.
 
Species: Sinai Home world: Sinai Prime Description: A race of gray skinned humanoids whose appearance is similar to our own, with the exception of golden glowing eyes and silver hair and very attractive by both sexes of human standards. They live in a utopia and utilize a primitive form of light technology. Their warriors follow a very honourable code. Their weapons are also light based and strong but they have rarely used them for centuries, until they were attacked by a genocidal aquatic empire. Their planet is Earth-like with a barely breathable atmosphere. Seasonal grasslands cover the entire surface. At the time of writing not a full member but an associate member.
 
Species: Imdali Home world: Imdali Prime in the Imdali Nebula system Description: A race of fun loving humanoids from Imdali Prime the Imdali Nebula system, they are 1.5 – 2.4m in height, come in a variety of colours, they have tentacle like head tails which protrude from the back of their skulls, their purpose is currently unknown.
 
 
Races of the Federation of Councils (oft referred to as the Federation)
 
Species: Ooari Home world: Ashojia V Description: A race of humanoid aliens who have three stomachs and no ears. They are an ancient race and have built an empire consisting of several thousand star systems. Founder of the Federation of Councils.
 
Species: V'Zaerg Home world: Gorganos I Description: A race of nocturnal echinoderms with binocular vision. They are most comfortable in temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius and squirt ink when threatened. A state lottery reduces population growth by killing those who win. The lottery is entered by drawing free money from a lottery cash machine. The more money they take, the higher the probability that they will be killed. Once an individual has left their home-world, they never permitted to return due to fear of contamination.
 
Species: Eoziban Home world: Ceilia IV Description: A race of cannibalistic monotremes with weak muscles and bony ridges on their heads. They breed clone armies during times of war.
 
Species: Evavgans Home world: Hihijisia VII Description: A race of plucky mammals who breathe nitrogen and spend much of their time meditating.
 
Species: Yishmurn Home world: Minaria III Description: A race of proud creatures who consider arguing to be a sport and ride winged creatures called gondars.
 
Species: Elorden Home world: Albea III Description: A race of lifeforms with large resonating chambers on the back of their heads, through which they speak. Their justice system is hierarchical, meaning that those with higher a social status are allowed to commit certain crimes while those with low social status are not. Only the ruling elite are allowed to commit murder.
 
Species: Rhelomoliak Home world: Arkona II Description: A race of greasy amphibians with large bulbous eyes. They have glands which release an airborne virus, making any creature they encounter violently sick. This is primarily a defence mechanism, but they remain mildly infection even when not threatened. They are generally apologetic about the sickness they cause in others, and they mass produce an antidote that allows them to interact with other species without causing too much discomfort.
 
Species: Sotani Home world: Tarsiss IV Description: A race of brightly coloured insects who like the cold. They punish political prisoners by removing their vocal chords.
 
Species: Mindoza Home world: Turlfania VII Description: A race of telekinetic bovids with hollow bones and extendible necks. They are environmentally conscious. They bought the technology required for interstellar travel from another species.
 
Species: Ulqaklepan Home world: Irikan IV Description: A race of gaseous life-forms who are governed by a military dictatorship. They once had an empire that stretched half-way across the galaxy, but their territory is now limited to a handful of star systems.
 
Species: Verbeni Home world: Zhivia III Description: A race of nocturnal brachiators with musk glands in their feet, which they use to mark their territory. They believe the universe hatched out of an egg and are very creative. They prefer not to leave their home-world and use robotic replicas of themselves to explore the galaxy instead. Population growth is strictly controlled by their government, and individuals are not allowed to reproduce without government authorization.
 
Species: Wixilans Home world: T'jog VIII Description: A race of octopus-like creatures. They are physically stronger than humans. These time-travellers originate in the distant future. When their home-world was destroyed by a natural disaster, they travelled millions of years back in time to found a new empire in the here and now.
 
Species: Darergane Home world: Algerion Description: A race of hairless mammaloids who are governed by a council of elders. They did not evolve on their current home-world, but travelled there from a distant star system thousands of years ago. The coordinates of their original home system has since been lost. They have three genders; male, female, and a third gender that supplies enzymes vital to conception.
 
Species: Xeegno Home world: Knara VII Description: A race of green rodents who wear chain mail. Their home-world is a frozen wasteland of ice and snow, and plants will only grow in a thin temperate region around the equator.
 
Species: Azaorn Home world: Grenushania Description: An asexual species with no visible genitalia, they reproduce by spawning. They are a peaceful civilization, dedicated to creative and leisure pursuits, such as art, music, dance and topiary. They have advanced scientific knowledge and an evolved sense of morality.
 
Species: Roman Home world: Roma IV Description: A race of aggressive and thrifty herd animals. They evolved on the same world as another intelligent race, but they exterminated them all long ago. They highly value their Elders and any disrespect or insult is considered a cause for war.
 
 
Non-aligned / Neutral Races
 
Species: Humanity - EA Home world: Earth Description: Humans.
 
Species: Bomerans Home world: Banton Description: A race of bat-like aliens with claws. They are afraid of water. Despite all their scientific and technological accomplishments, they never invented the pocket or the bag. They just had to carry things instead. When human clothier and bag salesman James Saddler arrived on their world, they were extremely embarrassed and purchased his entire stock. He now lives in a mansion near Richmond, Virginia. The species is divided into two distinct races; those with spots and those with stripes.
 
 
Non-aligned / Hostile Races
 
Species: Puans Home world: Geminus V Description: A race of small flying reptiles with large fangs and a deadly venomous bite. They are extremely hostile towards all species but their own. They have an extremely low-tech civilization and do not build their own starships, but they have been known to hitchhike on alien trading vessels. Their society is organized into several religious factions, each ruled by either a high priestess or a council of religious elders. Some religious groups actively promote the ritual killing of other life forms.
 
 
Belgian Kingdom Armed Forces
 
  • Commander – Supreme Commander of the Belgian Armed Forces (also the Queens brother and 2nd in line to the throne)
  • BAF – Belgian Armed Forces
  • RBN – Royal Belgian Navy
  • RM – Royal Marines (part of the RBN)
  • RP – Royal ParaCommados (also known as ODST)
  • ODST – Orbital Drop Shock Troopers (part of LFC)
  • LFC – Land Force Component
  • AFC – Air Force Component
  • RBMS – Royal Belgian Medical Service
  • SF – Special Forces
  • ISTAR - Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
  • COMOPSLAND – Commander of Operations Land Forces
  • COMOPSAIR – Commander of Operations Air forces
  • COMOPSNAV – Commander of Operations Naval forces
  • COMOPSMED – Commander of Operations Medical Services
  • CHOD – Chief of Defence
  • CSIS – Chief of Staff Intelligence and Security
 
Belgian Hell Gate Armour Specifications and Camouflage Scheme per Army Component
 
At the time of 1BE the Hell Gate I (HG-I) armour was in use. The armour contained the following but not limited to; Miniature Quantum Reactor, Shield Barriers, Motion Sensors, Internal Communications, Neural Interface, EMP and Radiation Shielded, Fully Environmentally Sealed, Oxygen Generator, HUD.
 
  • RBN – White armour with light blue low light optics.
  • RM – Blue jigsaw camouflage with light blue low light optics.
  • ParaCommando (ODST) – Both light grey, dark grey and black jigsaw pattern, green low light optics.
  • Infantry – alternating between the standard 8th version Belgian jigsaw camouflage and the desert version depending on terrain. Armour is programmed with both camouflage patterns and can be changed by the user instantly. Both camo’s have black low light optics.
  • Air force – Dark blue with white low light optics.
  • MS – Forest green with a yellow medical insignia in their upper arms and chest and yellow low light optics.
  • SF – Matte black with four red dots instead of lines, also low light optics.
  • ISTAR – Dark red with black low light optics.
 
 
Land Force Component
 
Each Land Component division consists of one staff HQ, and 5 brigades, which consist of 2 light brigades, 2 heavy brigades and a support brigade.
 
The Light Brigade is used for rapid interventions by air or space, on foot or with light vehicles. The men in the brigade are all qualified Paratrooper and Commando personnel, except for the light infantry battalions.
 
  • Light Brigade Headquarters
  • 2 Light infantry battalions
  • 2 ParaCommado battalions
  • Special Forces Group
  • 2 mobile VR-Training Centres
 
The Medium Brigade is used for actions where heavy firepower and heavily armoured vehicles are needed.
 
  • Medium Brigade Command
  • 3 heavy infantry battalions
 
The support units are:
 
  • 2 engineer battalions
  • 1 artillery battalion
  • 1 ISTAR battalion
  • 3 logistics battalions
  • 3 communication & information battalions In the support units are also ParaCommando qualified detachments.
 
Weapons are Belgian made by FN (Fabrique Nationale). At the time of 1BE, standard armament consisted of;
 
  • FN-G102AR Assault Rifle
  • FN-G06P Pistol
  • FN-G12SAW Semi-Automatic Weapon
  • FN-G99SR Sniper Rifle
  • FN-G35SG Shotgun The ‘G’ stands for Gauss. Standard are also fragmentation grenades, flash bangs and EMP grenades.
 
 
Air Force Component
 
Each Air Force Component (air wing) consists of the following aircraft
 
  • 50 Gunships
  • 50 Fighters
  • 25 Bombers
  • 100 Heavy transports
  • 100 troop transports
  • 25 ODST transports
  • 25 Supply transports
 
All aircraft have rail guns, missiles and/or torpedoes. All aircraft have multi-barrel rail gun Point Defence Systems (PDS).
 
 
Naval Forces
 
Each Naval Component (fleet) consist of the following ships;
 
1 Carrier with a compliment of 256 fighters 2 Dreadnaughts 4 Battleships 8 Light carriers with a compliment of 96 fighters each 16 Battle Cruisers 32 Cruisers 64 Light Cruisers 128 Destroyers 256 Frigates 1 Hospital Ship 2 Troop Carriers, carrying 5 divisions and 5 air wings each.
 
Troop Carriers and Hospital Ships are only present during invasions or when reinforcements are diverted to allied planets / systems under siege and requiring ground based reinforcements.
 
All ships are equipped with multiple gauss cannons, missile launchers and torpedo tubes. Bigger ships have a larger quantity and larger calibre of cannons and more missile launchers and torpedo tubes.
 
The hospital ship is the only unarmed ship. The troop carriers only have defensive systems. All ships have multi-barrel rail gun Point Defence Systems (PDS)
 
 
Anything else you would like to see in this wiki or require clarification, please leave a comment below.
submitted by muigleb to HFY [link] [comments]


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